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Assessing Students’ Civil Rights Claims Against 
School Resource Officers 
 
By Kerrin C. Wolf, JD, PhD1 
 
Abstract 
 
Police officers stationed in public schools, commonly referred 
to as school resource officers (SROs), have become commonplace 
in the United States over the past twenty-five years. Their 
primary responsibility is to maintain order and safety in schools, 
but they also serve as counselors and mentors for students, and 
teach classes related to drug and alcohol abuse, gang avoidance, 
and other topics.  SROs’ presence in schools raises important 
legal questions because they interact with students on a daily 
basis and are directly involved in schools’ efforts to control 
student behavior through school discipline and security.  
Additionally, a series of Supreme Court decisions has created an 
environment of limited rights for students in America’s public 
schools, which is compounded by the heightened security 
environments found in the majority of schools.  Amidst this 
environment, it is important to consider whether students have 
any recourse if SROs take actions that seemingly infringe on 
students’ rights.  This article seeks to address this specific 
question by analyzing students’ civil rights claims against SROs 
under Section 1983.  The available case law demonstrates that 
the involvement of SROs in school discipline matters can quickly 
escalate these situations to include aggressive, physical 
confrontations and arrests for relatively minor misbehavior.  Yet, 
Section 1983 rarely provides students with viable civil rights 
claims against SROs, even when the SROs’ behavior seems 
egregious.  These cases lend strong support to scholars and 
advocates’ concerns that the use of SROs, along with other 
heightened school security and punitive discipline measures, 
 
1. Kerrin C. Wolf is an Assistant Professor of Law at Stockton University, 
and completed a J.D. at the William and Mary Law School and a Ph.D. at the 
University of Delaware School of Public Policy and Administration. The author 
would like to thank Susan DeJarnatt and Jason P. Nance for their insightful 
comments on drafts of this article. 
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“criminalizes” public school students.  They also demonstrate 
that changes in the ways SROs operate in schools are needed to 
protect students’ rights. 
 
Keywords: education law, school discipline, civil rights, school 
resource officers 
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If a seventh grader starts trading fake burps for 
laughs in gym class, what’s a teacher to do? Order 
extra laps? Detention? A trip to the principal’s 
office? Maybe. But then again, maybe that’s too old 
school. Maybe today you call a police officer. And 
maybe today the officer decides that, instead of just 
escorting the now compliant thirteen-year-old to 
the principal’s office, an arrest would be a better 
idea. So out come the handcuffs and off goes the 
child to juvenile detention.2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, school resource officers (SROs) 
have become commonplace in American public schools.3  SROs 
are trained police officers stationed in schools, typically 
pursuant to an agreement between school districts and the 
officers’ police departments.4  Their primary responsibility is to 
maintain order and safety in schools, but they are also asked to 
serve as counselors and mentors for students, and to teach 
classes related to drug and alcohol abuse, gang avoidance, and 
other topics.5  SROs’ presence in schools raises important legal 
questions because they interact with students on a daily basis, 
and are directly involved in schools’ efforts to control student 
 
2.  A.M. ex rel F.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1169 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing in dissent that the school resource officer’s 
actions were not protected by qualified immunity against a civil rights claim 
by the arrested student). 
3.  See infra Part I.  
4.  SROs are sometimes referred to as school liaison officers, school 
security officers, or other designations.  Importantly, they are distinct from 
security guards employed directly by schools or school districts, though similar 
designations are sometimes used to refer to security personnel in these roles.  
SROs are employed by police departments, are answerable to their police 
supervisors, and operate within the confines of the agreement between their 
police departments and the schools/school districts in which they are stationed.  
See, e.g., Ben Brown, Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers: A 
Conceptual and Methodological Comment, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 591 (2006). 
5.  See, e.g., Mark Keierleber, Why So Few School Cops are Trained to 
Work with Kids, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.theatla 
ntic.com/education/archive/2015/11/why-do-most-school-cops-have-no-
student-training-requirements/414286/.  For a discussion of the increased use 
of SROs over the past 25 years, see infra Part I. 
3
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behavior through school discipline and security efforts.6 
Additionally, students’ rights are significantly curtailed in 
schools because of a desire to maintain safety and order, which 
alters the legal rules that guide these frequent interactions.7  A 
series of Supreme Court decisions has created an environment 
of limited rights for students in America’s public schools.8  This 
includes limited free speech rights, limited rights against 
searches and seizures, other limits on student privacy, and 
differing interrogation rules.  The effect of these limited rights 
is compounded by the heightened security environments found 
in the majority of schools, including closely monitored student 
movements, strict dress codes, strict behavioral expectations, 
and other security apparatuses and policies.9 
Prior legal scholarship has explored how this environment 
of limited rights and heightened security affects students’ rights 
in their interactions with SROs, such as SROs’ searches and 
interrogations of students.10  Elizabeth Shaver and Janet Decker 
recently conducted a detailed analysis of interactions between 
SROs and students with disabilities, including a review of recent 
lawsuits filed against SROs by such students based on several 
 
6.  See, e.g., School Resource Officers, NAT’L SCH. SAFETY & SECURITY 
SERVS., http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resource/school-resource-officers/ (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018) [hereinafter School Resource Officers]; What is a School 
Resource Officer?, COPS: COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/supportingsafeschools (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
7.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of 
Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 124 (2004).  For a complete discussion of 
students’ diminished rights in schools, see infra Part II. 
8.  See, e.g., Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both Worlds”: School Security 
and the Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. 
REV. 336 (2003); Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 124-31; Barry C. Feld, T.L.O 
and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth Amendment Questions: Few 
Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 950 (2011).   
9.  See, e.g., AARON KUPCHIK. HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN 
AN AGE OF FEAR 2-3 (2010); Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The 
Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 
79 (2008). 
10.  See Elizabeth A. Bradenburg, School Bullies - They Aren’t Just 
Students: Examining School Interrogations and the Miranda Warning, 59 
MERCER L. REV. 731 (2008); Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing 
Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39 
(2006); Peter Price, When is a Police Officer an Officer of the Law: The Status 
of Police Officers in Schools, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541 (2009). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1
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different legal theories.11  Yet, beyond students with disabilities, 
investigations of students’ potential legal remedies against 
SROs who may have infringed on their rights have been rare.12 
This article seeks to address this specific question by 
analyzing students’ civil rights claims against SROs under 
Section 1983.13  The analysis demonstrates that students’ 
potential civil rights remedies against abuses by SROs are quite 
limited because of the considerable leeway provided to SROs in 
their interactions with students by existing student rights 
jurisprudence.  Additionally, SROs’ dual roles as law 
enforcement officials and school administrators have made their 
legal status in their interactions with students unclear.  This 
significantly undermines students’ abilities to pursue Section 
1983 claims against SROs because the SROs can raise the 
qualified immunity defense, which defeats Section 1983 claims 
when the government officials’ actions do not clearly violate 
established rights.  Additionally, because applicable laws and 
school rules are particularly controlling of student behavior, 
SROs can more readily justify their more aggressive and 
antagonistic interactions with students. 
In addition to analyzing civil rights claims against SROs 
under Section 1983, this article will also explain the roles of 
SROs in schools, the reasons for their increased presence in 
schools, and their place among other heightened security and 
strict discipline policies that have infiltrated America’s public 
schools over the past twenty-five years.  It will then detail the 
various ways in which student rights are limited in schools, 
including how these limitations affect interactions between 
SROs and students.  Then, the article will explore Section 1983 
 
11.  Elizabeth A. Shaver & Janet R. Decker, Handcuffing a Third Grader? 
Interactions Between School Resource Officers and Students with Disabilities, 
2017 UTAH L. REV. 229. 
12.  The only exception to this is the work of Barry Feld, who notes that 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on student’s rights against unreasonable 
searches has significantly curtailed students’ ability to recover under Section 
1983 when they are searched.  See Feld, supra note 8, at 950. 
13.  This article will focus on federal civil rights claims.  Notably, there 
are a variety of other claims that may be available in certain situations, 
including state law claims and, as Shaver and Decker explore, claims under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) that students with disabilities may be able to pursue.  
See generally Shaver & Decker, supra note 11. 
5
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claims against SROs specifically by analyzing existing federal 
court opinions that have assessed such claims.  Finally, this 
article will contend that a clear standard should be set for SROs’ 
interactions with students in school.  Rather than continuing to 
treat SROs as hybrids between police officers and school 
employees, which muddles students’ rights in their interactions 
with SROs, courts should consistently apply the same standards 
that they apply to police officers working on the street to SROs 
in schools.  SROs should also be removed from schools’ 
disciplinary responses to minor student misbehavior.  These are 
the most effective ways to provide protections for students’ 
rights in their interactions with SROs. 
 
II. Understanding SROs 
 
The National Association of School Resource Officers 
(NASRO), the primary membership organization for SROs, 
defines SROs as “commissioned law-enforcement officers 
selected, trained, and assigned to protect and serve the 
education environment.”14  Typically, SROs are assigned to a 
school or set of schools based on an agreement between the local 
police department and the local school district.15  According to 
the “triad” model of school-based policing, SROs are expected to 
serve three roles in their schools: law enforcement officer, 
counselor, and educator.16 
In the law enforcement role, they both monitor schools for 
safety issues and disorder, and respond to incidents of student 
misbehavior, which can include taking part in the disciplinary 
response by the school.  SROs also help schools prepare for active 
shooter events and other emergencies.17  They monitor their 
 
14.  Nat’l Ass’n of Sch. Res. Officers, To Protect and Educate: The School 
Resource Officer and the Prevention of Violence in Schools, NASRO.ORG (2012), 
https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/NASRO-To-Protect-and-
Educate-nosecurity.pdf. 
15.  For a discussion of these agreements and variations on schools’ 
relationships with SROs and other police officers, see Lisa H. Thurau & 
Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline 
in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977 (2009).   
16.  School Resource Officers, supra note 6. 
17.  David C. May, Stephen D. Fessel & Shannon Means, Predictors of 
Principals’ Perceptions of School Resource Officer Effectiveness in Kentucky, 29 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1
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schools on a daily basis by walking the halls or watching security 
camera feeds.18  They might also be involved in screening 
students and school visitors as they enter school buildings to 
ensure they are not bringing weapons, drugs, or other 
contraband into the schools.19  In addition to these activities 
focused on maintaining safety, security and order, they also 
respond to incidents, such as fights, disorderly students, and 
other violations of criminal laws or school rules.20  This can 
include playing a role in resolving these incidents, but also 
arresting misbehaving students for alleged violations of criminal 
law.21 
In the counselor role, SROs are expected to form meaningful 
relationships with students to help guide them away from 
delinquency and towards success in school.  To fulfill this role, 
SROs sometimes serve as coaches for schools’ athletic teams or 
form informal mentorship relationships with students in the 
school.22  In the teacher role, SROs also lead classes related to 
their law enforcement experience.23  This can include Drug 
Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) or similar sessions 
focused on drug abuse, classes on gang avoidance, or classes on 
criminal law and the role of police in society.24 
 
AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 75 (2004).  
18.  Aaron Kupchik & Nicole L. Bracy, To Protect, Serve, and Mentor? 
Police Officers in Public Schools, in SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES 
OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 21-37 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres 
eds., 2009). 
19.  See, e.g., KATHLEEN NOLAN, POLICE IN THE HALLWAYS: DISCIPLINE IN AN 
URBAN HIGH SCHOOL 41-44 (2011). 
20.  Id. 
21.  See Kerrin C. Wolf, Booking Students: An Analysis of School Arrests 
and Court Outcomes, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 58 (2013). 
22.  Peter Finn et al., Comparison of Program Activities and Lessons 
Learned Among 19 School Resource Officer (SRO) Programs (Mar. 2005) 
(unpublished report), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209272.pdf; 
Kupchik & Bracy, supra note 18, at 23-27. 
23.  Ida M. Johnson, School Violence: The Effectiveness of a School 
Resource Officer Program in a Southern City, 27 J. CRIM. JUST. 173 (1999). 
24.  Anna Harvey, School Resource Officer Develops Friendship with 
Students, Staff, CARTERET COUNTY NEWS-TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015), 
http://www.carolinacoastonline.com/news_times/article_888a3794-938e-11e4-
9f98-77539cba085f.html; John Rosiak, How SROs Can Divert Students from 
the Juvenile Justice System, 8 DISPATCH (Community Oriented Policing 
Services, D.C.), May 2015, http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/05-
2015/sros_and_students.asp. 
7
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While school-based police officers have existed for many 
decades, their rise to prominence began in the 1990s.  During 
the 1980s and early 1990s, crime in the United States, including 
juvenile delinquency and crime in schools, became a prominent 
policy issue.25  Crime rates broadly, and crime in schools more 
specifically, peaked in the early 1990s.26  A wide variety of 
legislation was enacted at the federal and state level to combat 
crime, including the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994, which included funding for the placement of police officers 
in America’s school through community oriented policing 
programs.27  The number of SROs in schools expanded 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, due in part to highly 
publicized incidents such as the shootings at Columbine High 
School in Colorado.28  Additional federal funding for SROs was 
provided by The Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities 
Act.29  Currently, the Department of Justice estimates that there 
are approximately 19,000 SROs nationally.30 
SROs are one feature of a larger trend – the 
“criminalization” of American public school students.31  This 
term has been used by scholars to describe the incorporation of 
criminal justice techniques as tools to control and discipline 
students.32  Beyond employing police officers in schools and 
using arrests to respond to student misbehavior, schools have 
incorporated the following: controlled access to and movement 
 
25.  Russell J. Skiba, Reaching a Critical Juncture for Our Kids: The Need 
to Reassess School-Justice Practices, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 380 (2013). 
26.  See Scott Neuman, Violence in Schools: How Big a Problem Is It?, 
NPR (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/16/148758783/violence-in-
schools-how-big-a-problem-is-it. 
27.  42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2016).  
28.  Lynn A. Addington, Cops and Cameras: Public School Security as a 
Policy Response to Columbine, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1426 (2009); Ben 
Benton, Not All School Systems Have Resource Officers, but Most are Eyeing 
Them After Sandy Hook, TIMES FREE PRESS (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2013/mar/11/pencils-paper-
and-police/102094/. 
29.  NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43126, 
SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS (2013). 
30.  See Keierleber, supra note 5.  
31.  See Hirschfield, supra note 9; Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource 
Officers and the Criminalization of School Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280 
(2009). 
32.  See, e.g., Hirschfield, supra note 9. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1
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within schools, including requiring identification badges; 
security cameras; metal detectors; random suspicion-less 
searches of persons, personal property, and lockers, sometimes 
with drug sniffing dogs; use of restraints such as handcuffs; and 
the installation of metal bars and gates.33  Additionally, schools 
widely adopted strict discipline policies, including “zero 
tolerance” policies, which require school administrators to use 
exclusionary school discipline measures such as suspensions in 
response to a wide array of both serious and minor acts of 
student misbehavior.34  These policies were encouraged by 
federal legislation that attached funding to schools’ adoption of 
zero tolerance policies for weapons and drug offenses, but states 
and school districts expanded their scope to a wider array of less 
serious misbehavior.35 
These heightened security measures and strict disciplinary 
approaches have received a wide array of criticisms.  For 
example, advocates and scholars suggest that they feed “the 
school-to-prison pipeline” by exposing students to frequent 
exclusions from school that derail their academic progress and 
propel them towards lives of criminality.36  Moreover, they may 
expose students to unfair or unreasonable treatment, such as 
discipline responses that are outsized compared with students’ 
misbehavior.  The media frequently covers stories of students 
facing suspensions for seemingly benign behavior,37 and studies 
 
33.  Id.  
34.  ZERO TOLERANCE: RESISTING THE DRIVE FOR PUNISHMENT IN OUR 
SCHOOLS (William Ayers, Bernardine Dohrn & Rick Ayers eds., 2001); 
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES 
SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE (2000); Jason P. Nance, Students, Police and the School-to-Prison 
Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919, 932-33 (2016). 
35.  Jeanne B. Stinchcomb, Gordon Bazemore & Nancy Riestenberg, 
Beyond Zero Tolerance: Restoring Justice in Secondary Schools, 4 YOUTH 
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 123 (2006); See Nance, supra note 34, at 932-34. 
36.  See, e.g., DANIEL J. LOSEN & TIA ELENA MARTINEZ, CTR. FOR  CIVIL 
RIGHTS REMEDIES, OUT OF SCHOOL & OFF TRACK: THE OVERUSE OF SUSPENSIONS 
IN AMERICAN MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOLS (2013); SAMANTHA POWNALL, NEW 
YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A, B, C, D, STPP: HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE FEEDS 
THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE (2013); Russell Skiba, Mariella I. Arredondo 
& Natasha T. Williams, More Than a Metaphor: The Contribution of 
Exclusionary Discipline to a School-to-Prison Pipeline. 47 EQUITY & 
EXCELLENCE EDUC. 546 (2014). 
37.  See, e.g., Ian Urbina, It’s a Fork, It’s a Spoon, It’s a . . . Weapon?, N.Y. 
9
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of the use of suspensions by schools reveal that they are 
frequently used for relatively minor acts of student 
misbehavior.38  Additionally, some research suggests that 
schools that rely heavily on such measures and policies create 
environments that are less inclusive for students and are 
actually less safe.39 
SROs have also been subject to these criticisms.  For 
example, many SROs may not be sufficiently trained to interact 
with school-aged children.40  Their training has traditionally 
focused on their law enforcement role, with little training on 
counseling, teaching, or interacting with children.41 
Scholars have also pointed out that SROs’ law enforcement 
and counselor roles can often conflict, as they may attempt to 
mentor students and then have to arrest the same students, 
thereby destroying any trust they had built.42  In this respect, 
their dual roles as law enforcement officers and school 
administrators creates confusion.  Even when these roles are not 
in direct conflict, the presence of SROs in schools can lead to an 
increase in student arrests, thereby feeding the pipeline.43 
Just as suspensions have frequently been used by schools as 
disciplinary responses to relatively minor misbehavior, arrests 
of students by SROs (and other police officers called to schools) 
 
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/education/12dis 
cipline.html.  
38.  See, e.g., KUPCHIK, supra note 9, at 44-45. 
39.  See Charles Crawford & Ronald Burns, Reducing School Violence: 
Considering School Characteristics and the Impacts of Law Enforcement, 
School Security, and Environmental Factors, 39 INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & 
MGMT. 455 (2016); Irwin A. Hyman & Donna C. Perone, The Other Side of 
School Violence: Educator Policies and Practices That May Contribute to 
Student Misbehavior, 36 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 7 (1998); Jason P. Nance, School 
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 79, 104-06 
[hereinafter School Surveillance]; ACLU & ACLU OF CONN., HARD LESSONS: 
SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS AND SCHOOL-BASED ARRESTS IN THREE 
CONNECTICUT TOWNS (2008). 
40.  See Kathy E. Martinez-Prather, Joseph M. McKenna & Scott W. 
Bowman, The Impact of Training on Discipline Outcomes in School-Based 
Policing, 39 INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 478 (2016); Jason P. Nance, 
Rethinking Law Enforcement in Schools, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 151 
(2016) [hereinafter Rethinking Law Enforcement]; Keierleber, supra note 5. 
41.  See, e.g., TEXAS APPLESEED, SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: TICKETING, 
ARREST, AND USE OF FORCE IN SCHOOLS 12 (2010); Keierleber, supra note 5. 
42.  See KUPCHIK, supra note 9. 
43.  See Nance, supra note 34.  
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1
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overwhelmingly arise out of minor misbehavior, such as 
disorderly conduct and misdemeanor assault charges.44  There 
have also been reports of abusive behavior by SROs against 
students, including acts of violence.45  For example, several news 
reports have featured videos of SROs’ violent treatment of 
students.46  The New York Civil Liberties Union and American 
Civil Liberties Union documented a wide variety of abuses by 
school resource officers in New York City, including derogatory, 
abusive, and discriminatory comments, inappropriate sexual 
attention, and physical abuse.47 
Despite these criticisms, SROs remain a common fixture in 
many American public schools.  For example, the mass shooting 
at Sandy Hook Elementary in Connecticut led to renewed calls 
for the increased use of SROs in schools.48  In the schools in 
which they are stationed, they will continue to have frequent 
contact with students, including being a primary response when 
students misbehave.  Accordingly, it is essential to understand 
the civil rights remedies available to students. 
 
 
 
44.  See Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools: 
Effects on School Crime and the Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q. 
619 (2013); Nance, supra note 35; Wolf, supra note 21. 
45.  See, e.g., Dana Ford, Greg Batelho & Kevin Conlon, Spring Valley 
High School Officer Suspended After Violent Classroom Arrest, CNN (Oct. 27, 
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/27/us/south-carolina-school-arrest-video/. 
46.  See, e.g., Sarah Aarthun & Holly Yan, Student’s Violent Arrest Caught 
on Video; Officer Under Investigation, CNN (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/26/us/south-carolina-spring-valley-high-school-
student-video/index.html; Sam Levin, Girl Body-slammed by North Carolina 
Officer was Stopping a Fight, Students Say, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/04/high-school-girl-body-
slammed-police-officer-north-carolina; Avianne Tan, 2 Baltimore School Police 
Officers Charged in Assault of Student Caught on Video, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9, 
2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/baltimore-school-police-officers-charged-
assault-student-caught/story?id=37518067. 
47.  ELORA MUKHERJEE & MARVIN M. KARPATKIN, NEW YORK CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION & ACLU, CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM: THE OVER-POLICING 
OF NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS (2007).  
48.  Donna St. George & Ovetta Wiggins, Schools Taking Serious Look at 
Putting Armed Police in Schools After Massacre, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2013),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/schools-taking-serious-look-
at-putting-armed-police-in-schools-after-massacre/2013/02/07/f2fcc9ec-6e11-
11e2-ac36-3d8d9dcaa2e2_story.html. 
11
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III. Students’ Diminished Rights in School 
 
Before specifically considering the potential for civil rights 
claims against SROs, the diminished rights of American public-
school students must first be explored.  Students’ rights against 
search and seizure, Miranda rights, and free speech rights are 
all limited in the school environment.  Additionally, the strict 
discipline codes and heightened security measures that are 
commonplace in America’s schools further limit students’ rights. 
 
A.  Searches 
 
The right against unreasonable searches by government 
officials springs from the Fourth (and by extension, the 
Fourteenth) Amendment.  The standard for when a student can 
be searched by a school official is less stringent than the 
probable cause standard that applies to searches by the police in 
most contexts.49  School personnel are only required to have a 
reasonable suspicion that a student has violated the law or a 
school rule.  Citing the need for schools to maintain order, the 
Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. held that requiring 
school officials to have probable cause to search a student would 
be unreasonable.50  Instead, the Court set forth a two-part test: 
whether the search was justified at its inception and whether 
the search “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
which justified the interference in the first place.”51  This 
standard is more relaxed in two ways: first, the amount of 
 
49.  In order for a police officer to conduct a search of a person she 
encounters on the street, she must generally have probable cause, the standard 
required to obtain a warrant.  However, there are some exceptions to this.  If 
the officer’s search is merely a “stop and frisk”, she must only have reasonable 
suspicion that the search will produce evidence of a crime or contraband, such 
as illicit drugs or weapons.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  During such 
a stop, in order to perform a search that goes beyond a pat down, such as 
reaching into pockets or clothes or opening bags, the officer must have probable 
cause (which sometimes is obtained from evidence gathered during the pat 
down).  Id. at 19.  Probable cause is also not required when “exigent 
circumstances” require the search and when police are conducting certain 
routinized searches.  See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
50.  See generally 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
51.  Id. at 341. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1
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evidence that is required is less;52 and second, school officials can 
suspect the student of violating the law or a school rule,53 which 
can include a much wider swath of behavior, such as possessing 
cell phones and other items considered contraband in school, but 
are permissible elsewhere. 
Following T.L.O., the Court expanded the ability of schools 
to search students, even when individualized suspicion is not 
present.  First, in Vernonia School District v. Acton, the Court 
held that random drug testing of students participating in 
athletics was permissible, based in part on evidence that student 
drug abuse was a problem in the school.54  The Court emphasized 
that the school’s effort to deter and detect drug use both 
protected students from drug’s ill effects and prevented 
disruption of the educational process.55  Then, in Board of 
Education v. Earls, the Court upheld a school’s random drug 
testing regime that applied to all participants in extracurricular 
activities.56  The school offered no proof of a drug problem in the 
school, but instead contended that it was attempting to curb 
student drug use generally.57 
General, suspicionless searches of students beyond the drug 
testing programs that were at issue in Acton and Earls are also 
commonplace, with little restrictions on their use.  For example, 
during the 2013-2014 school year, close to one quarter of all 
public schools58 in the United States reported the use of drug 
 
52.  Id. at 341 (“We join the majority of courts that have examined this 
issue in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of 
schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for 
freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to 
the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the 
subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of 
a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all 
the circumstances, of the search.”). 
53.  Id. at 341-42 (“Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student 
by a teacher or other school official will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there 
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence 
that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the 
school.” [emphasis added]). 
54.  See 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
55.  Id. at 661-62. 
56.  See 536 US 822 (2002). 
57.  Id. at 835-36. 
58.  This includes elementary, middle and high schools.  Presumably, the 
use of drug sniffing dogs is concentrated in middle and high schools. 
13
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sniffing dogs.59  Courts have frequently permitted schools to 
stage unannounced searches with drug sniffing dogs and then 
search students’ personal effects if the dog signals that drugs 
may be present.  Generally, students do not have an expectation 
of privacy when they are in school, beyond their personal effects.  
As such, courts do not view dog sniffing of exteriors of lockers, 
cars, and other objects in the school as searches requiring any 
level of suspicion.60  Then, if a drug sniffing dog signals that an 
object may contain contraband, the signal provides sufficient 
evidence for a search, regardless of whether the reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause standard applies.61  Schools perform 
general, suspicionless searches of students in other ways as well, 
including the use of metal detectors and bag searches as 
students enter school, and random sweeps for contraband.62  
Recently, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of numerous students 
who were subject to a mass, suspicionless search of their persons 
by police officers during a four-hour lockdown at their school.  
The officers were searching for illegal drugs. They were most 
concerned about thirteen students at the school, but decided to 
search all students.63 
 
 
 
59.  Digest of Educational Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., tbl. 
233.50, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_233.50.asp. 
60.  See, e.g., In re Dengg, 724 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) 
(“[T]he use of a drug sniffing dog to detect the presence of contraband, by 
sniffing the exterior of an object, is not a ‘search’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”); Rudolph ex rel. Williams v. Lowndes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 
242 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1120 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (“Clearly, the activity of the drug-
sniffing dog walking up and down the aisles sniffing for contraband is not a 
Fourth Amendment search.”). 
61.  See, e.g., Marner v. Eufaula City Sch. Bd., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (M.D. 
Ala. 2002) (holding that once drug sniffing dog signaled that a car contained 
contraband, a search was permitted without a warrant); Dengg, 724 N.E.2d at 
1260 (dog alerted to student’s car during a school–side sweep constituted 
probable cause for police officers conducting the search).  See also Feld, supra 
note 8, at 905-11.  
62.  Digest of Educational Statistics, supra note 59 (finding that 
approximately 11 percent of schools perform random sweeps for contraband 
and approximately 2 percent use metal detectors). 
63.  Jacey Fortin, ‘How Far Can They Go?’ Police Search of Hundreds of 
Students Stokes Lawsuit and Constitutional Questions, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/us/georgia-police-patdown-studen 
ts.html.  
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In Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, the Court 
identified some limits on schools’ ability to search students.64  
This case arose out of a strip search of a female high school 
student.65  The school administrator who directed the search was 
investigating a report of drugs being distributed in school.66  The 
strip-searched student was known to associate with a delinquent 
group of students and her planner was found containing 
contraband while in the possession of another student.67  After 
the contraband was discovered, the student was questioned and 
her backpack was searched yielding no additional drugs or other 
contraband.68  A school administrator then ordered a strip 
search, which also did not produce any contraband.69  The Court 
held that the search of the backpack was reasonable, but the 
strip search went too far.70  The Court identified strip searches 
as particularly intrusive, requiring individualized suspicion that 
contraband was being concealed on the student’s person.71  Thus, 
while this search was reasonable at its inception, the scope of 
the search was excessive. 
While Redding identified some limits of schools’ ability to 
search students, the reasonable suspicion standard has 
permitted invasive searches of students to occur based on 
relatively benign behavior.  For example, a search of student’s 
backpack was deemed permissible based only on student’s 
proximity to a fire that had been set in the school and the 
student pulling his hood up to cover part of his face after 
encountering a teacher.72  A search of a student’s car by a school 
security officer similarly did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
when the student was seen going to his car without a proper pass 
and when students smoking in the parking lot was an ongoing 
problem at the school.73  Thus, the standard for searching a 
 
64.  See 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. at 368. 
67.  Id. 
68.  Id. at 368-69. 
69.  Id. at 369. 
70.  Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 375-77.  
71.  Id. at 376-77. 
72.  Vassallo v. Lando, 591 F. Supp. 2d 172, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
73.  Anders v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 124 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (N.D. 
Ind. 2000). 
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student is quite low, and can be triggered by suspicions of a wide 
array of suspected misbehavior, whether it be illegal or in 
violation of school rules. 
 
B.  Searches by SROs 
 
The presence of school resource officers in schools presents 
two intriguing constitutional questions relating to searches.  
First, when working in concert with school resource officers to 
investigate alleged student misconduct, are school officials 
beholden to the reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
standard?  Second, do SROs, who fill both law enforcement and 
educational roles in their schools, need probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a constitutionally permissible 
search of a student in school?  Notably, the Supreme Court in 
T.L.O. expressly avoided deciding these questions: “This case 
does not present the question of the appropriate standard for 
assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in 
conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, 
and we express no opinion on that question.”74 
Courts have held that school administrators must have 
probable cause to conduct a search of a student when the search 
is done at the direction or request of a police officer because the 
administrator is an agent of law enforcement under these 
circumstances.75  However, this analysis quickly becomes murky 
when the relationship between the school official and police 
officer is not as clear cut.  For example, in State v. Heirtzler, the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court confirmed a trial court’s finding 
that school administrators were agents of law enforcement when 
they investigated student drug offenses because the school 
resource officer had “delegated the responsibility of 
investigating less serious, potential criminal matters – drug 
 
74.  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985).  The Court has 
not addressed this issue subsequently.  See also Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & 
Judith A. Miller, Law Enforcement Officers in Public Schools: Student Citizens 
in Safe Havens?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25 (1999) (discussing the standards 
that apply to searches performed by police officers in schools in the wake of 
T.L.O.).  
75.  Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing 
Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law 
Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1089-90 (2003).  
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1
WOLF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:20 PM 
2018 CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS AGAINST SROs 231 
cases – to school officials.”76  In the school in question, the school 
resource officer had an agreement with school officials that he 
would handle larger scale investigations and the school officials 
would handle investigations of the less serious offenses. 
Courts are divided regarding the question of whether school 
resource officers need probable cause or reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a search of a student on school grounds.77  For example, 
in People v. Dilworth, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that 
an SRO needed only reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of 
a student because the search was conducted in furtherance of 
preserving order in the school, not as a law enforcement 
function.78  Similarly, the Pennsylvania Superior Court and a 
Florida Court of Appeals ruled that SROs only needed 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search on school grounds 
because they are school officials, not law enforcement agents.79  
Conversely, in State v. Tywayne H., where a gun was found on a 
student by an SRO at a school dance, the Court of Appeals of 
New Mexico determined that probable cause was required for a 
valid search of the student because the officer was a law 
enforcement agent.80  New Mexico seems to be in the minority, 
however.  The Tennessee Supreme Court summarized the 
various jurisdictions’ stances on school resource officer searches 
as follows: 
 
The majority of jurisdictions which have faced the 
issue of what standard to apply to SROs or law 
enforcement officers assigned to schools have 
applied the reasonable suspicion standard. . . . In 
contrast, where law enforcement officers, not 
associated with the school system, initiate a 
search, or where school officials act at the behest 
of law enforcement agencies, the probable cause 
 
76.  789 A.2d 634, 640 (N.H. 2001). 
77.  See Price, supra note 10; Beger, supra note 8. 
78.  661 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 1996). 
79.  T.S. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Commonwealth v. 
J.B., 719 A.2d 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); State v. D.S., 685 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
80.  933 P.2d 251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). 
17
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standard is generally applied.81 
 
On this basis, the Court determined that in Tennessee: 
 
[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is the 
appropriate standard to apply to searches 
conducted by a law enforcement officer assigned 
to a school on a regular basis and assigned duties 
at the school beyond those of a[n] ordinary law 
enforcement officer such that he or she may be 
considered a school official as well as a law 
enforcement officer, whether labeled an “SRO” or 
not. However, if a law enforcement officer not 
associated with the school system searches a 
student in a school setting, that officer should be 
held to the probable cause standard.82 
 
Thus, as the R.D.S. decision indicates, in most states 
probable cause is only required for searches of students by police 
officers when the investigation is strictly a law enforcement 
action.  With SROs increasingly present at schools, most 
searches conducted by them and school officials need only be 
prompted by reasonable suspicion because the SROs can readily 
claim their searches arose out of their school official role.  Most 
relevant to potential Section 1983 claims against SROs for 
unconstitutional searches, the shifting roles of SROs – between 
police officer and school official – render the level of suspicion 
needed for a search unclear in many situations. 
Even if the probable cause standard is applied to SROs, 
school officials and SROs can easily circumvent it by choosing to 
have a school official search the student, as long as it is not 
clearly done at the SRO’s behest.  Bracy found this to be a 
strategy employed in the schools she observed during her 
ethnographic observations of SROs.83  Bracy noted that SROs 
and administrators were sometimes purposeful in their efforts 
 
81.  R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 367-68 (Tenn. 2008). 
82.  Id. at 369. 
83.  Nicole L. Bracy, Circumventing the Law: Students’ Rights in Schools 
with Police, 26 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 294 (2010). 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1
WOLF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:20 PM 
2018 CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS AGAINST SROs 233 
to ensure that the lesser reasonable suspicion standard applied 
to their searches of students by ensuring that the search was 
conducted by a school official.84 
 
C.  Interrogations in School 
 
Students’ Miranda rights are also somewhat limited in the 
school context.  Courts have consistently held that students are 
not in custody when being questioned by school administrators 
because, as in search situations, school officials are not law 
enforcement agents.85  Therefore, students need not be read the 
Miranda warning.  This is the case even when the administrator 
plans to turn evidence gathered during the questioning over to 
the police.86 
For example, in State v. Barrett, a Louisiana appellate court 
found that a Miranda warning was not required when a student 
was questioned by a school administrator following a police-led 
search of a classroom with drug-sniffing dogs.87  The dogs 
focused on the student’s wallet in which a large amount of cash 
was found.88  Then, a beeper was found in his backpack.89  The 
school administrator asked the student why he had so much 
money and the student admitted to drug dealing.90  The court in 
Barrett opined that even though the police and administrator 
were working together to conduct the drug sweep, at the time of 
the questioning the student “had not been taken into custody, 
detained, or deprived of his freedom of action, other than as 
appropriate considering his status as a student at school.”91 
Similarly, in In the matter of V.P., a Texas court held that a 
school official was not required to provide a Miranda warning 
nor stop questioning a student even after he asked for a lawyer.92  
 
84.  Id.  
85.  See, e.g., State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580 (N.H. 1998); State v. 
Biancamano, 666 A.2d 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); See generally 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
86.  See, e.g., Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 580. 
87.  State v. Barrett, 683 So.2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
88.  Id. at 334. 
89.  Id.  
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. at 339. 
92.  In re V.P., 55 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex. App. 2001). 
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Another student had reported to a school resource officer that 
V.P. had brought a gun to school.93  Upon hearing this 
information, the school resource officer and a hall monitor 
removed V.P. from his class, asked him about the gun, and then 
frisked him.94  Then, the officer brought V.P. to an assistant 
principal’s office.95  The school resource officer left the room and 
the assistant principal and hall monitor questioned V.P. about 
the gun.96  During the questioning, V.P. asked for a lawyer and 
his mother, but the questioning continued.97  He eventually 
confessed to having the gun.98  Following the confession, the 
school resource officer retrieved the gun, arrested V.P., and read 
him the Miranda warning.99  In explaining why V.P’s confession 
to the vice principal was admissible, the court stated: 
 
Even assuming appellant was in custody as he 
walked with [the S.R.O.] from his classroom to 
[the vice principal]’s office, once [the S.R.O.] left 
the office, V.P. was no longer in custody as [the 
vice principal] questioned him about the gun. [The 
vice principal] questioned V.P. about the gun 
primarily because he was concerned about the 
safety of the other students and faculty. Until the 
gun was located and the matter turned over to 
[the S.R.O.], [the vice principal] was conducting a 
school investigation, not a criminal 
investigation. . . .  That [the vice principal] 
questioned appellant on the basis of a tip from 
[the S.R.O.] did not transform the questioning into 
custodial interrogation, and we have not found 
any case law indicating that a student has the 
constitutional right to remain silent or to consult 
with a lawyer in the face of questioning by a school 
principal. Because V.P. was not in official custody 
 
93.  Id. at 27. 
94.  Id.  
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. 
98.  In re V.P., 55 S.W.3d at 28.  
99.  Id. 
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when questioned, he did not have the legal right 
to remain silent or to speak to his lawyer.100 
 
Thus, even when an SRO is directly involved in the investigation 
into student misconduct, a Miranda warning is often not 
required if a school administrator performs the task of 
questioning the student. 
When SROs question students in school about alleged 
criminal conduct, courts have often, but not always, concluded 
that a Miranda warning was required.  For example, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a Miranda warning was 
required when school resource officers conduct custodial 
interrogations in school.101  A Court of Appeals of Texas similarly 
held that a Miranda warning was required when as student was 
questioned by a school resource officer with his office door 
closed.102  The court noted that the officer had probable cause to 
make an arrest at the time of the questioning (at least fifteen 
students had reported that the student had a gun) and the 
circumstances of the questioning would not have led the student 
to believe he was free to leave.103 
However, some courts have found that students are not in 
custody when questioned by SROs because school is not a 
threatening environment, like a police station, where coercion is 
likely to occur.104  For example, in In re Marquita M., the 
Appellate Court of Illinois held that a student who was 
questioned by an SRO in a school administrator’s office was not 
in custody, pointing to the lack of badgering questions, the 
relatively short duration of questions, and the school 
environment.105  Similarly, in State v. C.D., the Indiana 
Appellate Court determined that a student was not in custody 
when he was questioned by a school administrator and an SRO 
 
100.  Id. at 33. 
101.  In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2002). 
102.  In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App. 2002). 
103.  Id. at 510. 
104.  See, e.g., In re Erik E., No. 1 CA-JV 08-0024, 2008 WL 4216544 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2008); In re J.H., 928 A.2d 643 (D.C. 2007); In re Welfare of 
B.M.K., No. A07-0852, 2008 WL 1972488 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
105.  970 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
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about being under the influence of drugs.106  The court reasoned 
that the questioning was done for educational purposes, and not 
as part of a criminal justice investigation (even though the 
student’s admissions led to eventual delinquency charges).107 
While some courts have found that Miranda warnings are 
required when SROs question students about illegal conduct at 
school, some have concluded otherwise.  Just like the law 
regarding searches of students conducted by SROs, this area of 
law is unsettled and therefore does not provide clear guidance to 
SROs in their interactions with students. 
 
D.  Other Limitations on Students’ Constitutional Rights 
 
The limits on students’ rights are not limited to searches 
and seizures, and interrogations.  For example, even though 
students have some rights to free speech in school, the 
limitations on student speech are relatively stringent. 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Community Independent School 
District,108 the Supreme Court declared that students have free 
speech rights in school.  In that case, the Court confirmed two 
students’ right to wear black arm bands to protest the Vietnam 
War, but noted that student speech could be limited if it caused 
substantial disruption to the school environment.109  While this 
decision seemed to bestow a wide array of rights on students, 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions that considered student 
free speech rights eroded those rights considerably. 
For example, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the 
Court stated that a school did not violate a student’s free speech 
rights when it sanctioned him for giving a profane speech during 
an assembly related to student elections.110  The Court cited a 
school’s interest in teaching values as the rationale for limiting 
student speech.111  In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 
the Court confirmed a school’s censorship of a student 
newspaper, reasoning that the newspaper was a school 
 
106.  947 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
107.  Id. at 1022-23. 
108.  393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
109.  Id. 
110.  478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
111.  Id. 
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sponsored tool of pedagogy and, therefore, the school could 
exercise editorial control over its content.112  Then, in Morse v. 
Frederick, the Court ruled that a free speech violation had not 
occurred when a school suspended a student for declining to 
follow a directive to take down a “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” banner 
during an extracurricular event, reasoning that speech that 
encouraged drug use could be censored by schools because it was 
contrary to existing anti-drug policies at the school.113  What 
emerges from these cases are free speech protections for 
students that fall far below those enjoyed outside of the school 
context.  The Court relies on the “special circumstances” of the 
school to place significant limits on speech.  For example, the 
speech in Tinker was allowed because it was political and non-
disruptive.  In the subsequent cases, the Court confirmed that 
schools may limit speech that threatens to disrupt the school 
environment or that interferes with the pedagogical mission of 
the schools, such as teaching values or proper behavior. 
Thus, students’ free speech rights are significantly 
diminished in schools.  Erwin Chemerinsky characterized this 
line of Supreme Court decisions as “part of a larger failure on 
the part of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution when it 
comes to schools.”114  While actions by SROs are unlikely to 
infringe on students’ free speech rights, the limitations on those 
rights further demonstrate the restricted rights environment of 
American public schools. 
 
E.  Other Restrictions on Students’ Privacy and Freedoms 
 
The increasingly strict, broad, and sometimes vague codes 
of student conduct that have become more common in schools 
over the past twenty-five years115 further diminish students’ 
privacy and freedoms.  As mentioned above, student searches by 
 
112.  484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
113.  551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
114.  Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 124. 
115.  See, e.g., CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT, 
THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 79-80 (2010); 
Kerrin Wolf, Mary Kate Kalinich & Susan DeJarnatt, Charting School 
Discipline, 48 URB. LAW. 1 (2016) (detailing strict and vague codes of conduct 
in charter schools); KUPCHIK, supra note 9. 
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school administrators and SROs can be predicated on suspected 
violations of school rules.  So, when school rules restrict the use 
and possession of cell phones and other devices, and make broad 
restrictions on “disorderly” behavior, they provide broad 
authority for schools to search students.  When schools rely on 
SROs to conduct these searches, they create adversarial 
encounters between SROs and students that can quickly 
escalate and lead to criminal charges against students.  Some of 
the cases discussed below demonstrate how a relatively benign 
violation of a school rule can quickly escalate when SROs become 
involved, and lead to student arrests and civil rights claims 
against SROs.116 
Heightened security measures further limit students’ rights 
in school.  For example, the widespread use of security cameras 
in schools inhibits students’ privacy throughout the day.  
Likewise, the use of drug-sniffing dogs and random locker 
searches further comprise student privacy.117  Some schools also 
feature metal detectors that aid schools’ efforts to search 
students for contraband as they enter school each day.118  Thus, 
in many ways, American public school students have 
significantly curtailed rights when they are in school and, as the 
cases below demonstrate, these diminished rights are in full 
display in their interactions with SROs, leaving them with little 
recourse when their rights seem to have been violated by an 
SRO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116.  See infra Part III.C. 
117.  For a discussion of students’ privacy interests when confronted with 
drug-sniffing dogs, see, e.g., Todd Feinberg, Suspicionless Canine Sniffs: Does 
the Fourth Amendment Prohibit Public Schools from Using Dogs to Search 
Without Individualized Suspicion?, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 271 (2007).  
See also infra Part III.A. 
118.  See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 19. 
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IV. Establishing Civil Rights Claims Against School Resource 
Officers 
 
Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action against public 
officials who violate a person’s civil rights.119  Plaintiffs who 
assert these claims must meet a high bar to succeed – they must 
both establish that one of their rights was violated and that the 
law in place at the time clearly established that the public 
official’s actions violated a constitutional right.  In Saucier v. 
Katz, the Supreme Court established this two-part test for 
analyzing civil rights claims: “[T]he first inquiry must be 
whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the 
facts alleged; second, assuming the violation is established,” the 
court must address “whether the right was clearly 
established . . . on a . . . specific level” at the time of the official’s 
actions.120 
The Supreme Court modified the Saucier two-part test 
slightly in Pearson v. Callahan, holding that the two-step 
analysis must not be strictly adhered to in every case.121  
Specifically, it allowed courts to first answer the question of 
whether the right that was allegedly violated was clearly 
established, thus sometimes avoiding having to make a 
determination if a right was in fact violated in the case at hand. 
The second part of the test is commonly referred to as 
qualified immunity.  The justification for this defense rests on 
the belief that police officers and public officials should feel free 
to take actions that are not in clear violation of the law without 
fear of lawsuit.  As the Court explained in Harlow v. Fitzgerald: 
 
Where an official could be expected to know that 
certain conduct would violate statutory or 
constitutional rights, he should be made to 
 
119.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every  person  who,  under  color  of  any  
statute,  ordinance,  regulation,  custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or  causes  to  be  subjected,  any  citizen  of  
the  United  States  or  other  person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress”).  
120.  533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 
121.  555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
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hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused 
by such conduct may have a cause of action. But 
where an official’s duties legitimately require 
action in which clearly established rights are not 
implicated, the public interest may be better 
served by action taken “with independence and 
without fear of consequences.”122 
 
Civil rights claims against SROs most commonly arise out 
of the Fourth Amendment violations for unreasonable searches 
or unreasonable seizures.  The latter may come in the form of an 
unlawful/wrongful arrest or through the use of excessive force.  
In order to establish whether a constitutional right was clearly 
established, courts evaluate whether a reasonable SRO would 
have understood that what he was doing violated a 
constitutional right.123  Courts look for precedential cases that 
feature similar fact patterns and claims.  However, plaintiffs do 
not have to produce prior case law that matches their claims 
exactly; rather, the question is whether the law provides fair and 
clear notice that the SROs’ actions violated the law.124  As one 
court explained, qualified immunity allows SROs to make 
mistakes in judgment, but does not protect “the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”125 
Thus, plaintiffs pursuing Section 1983 claims against SROs 
(and other public officials) are fighting an uphill battle.  Even 
when a student’s rights were likely violated, her claim will not 
be successful without establishing that a reasonable officer in 
the SRO’s position would have known that his actions were a 
violation of the law. 
 
 
 
 
 
122.  457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 
(1967)). 
123.  Johnson ex. rel. Smith v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467 
(E.D. Mich. 2006). 
124.  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
125.  G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1241 (D.N.M. 
2013) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)). 
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 A. Section 1983 Claims Against SROs Arising Out of Alleged 
Violations of Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights 
Against Unreasonable Searches 
 
As discussed above, courts have frequently, but not 
consistently, determined that SROs are beholden to the 
reasonable suspicion standard that applies to school officials 
when conducting searches of students.  Due to existing 
jurisprudence that holds that this lower level of suspicion is all 
that is required in many SRO searches of students, it is 
relatively easy for an SRO to demonstrate that his actions did 
not clearly violate a student’s rights when facing a 1983 claim 
arising out of a student search. 
For example, in James v. Unified School District No. 512, a 
student’s Section 1983 claim against an SRO who took part in 
the search of the student’s car was dismissed because the court 
found that existing case law was unclear as to whether an SRO 
needed reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct a 
search.126  According to the student’s claims, the only evidence 
that supported the need for a search was an anonymous call from 
someone claiming to be a parent of a student at the school that 
the plaintiff kept a gun in his car.127  While the court determined 
that the probable cause standard applied to the SRO’s search in 
this circumstance, it nonetheless held that prior case law was 
insufficiently clear as to which standard applied to SROs, 
thereby supporting the SRO’s qualified immunity defense.128 
Similarly, in Thomas v. Roberts, the Eleventh Circuit found 
that a mass strip search of fifth graders was unconstitutional, 
but qualified immunity protected the SRO and school officials 
who conducted the search from Section 1983 liability.129  The 
case arose out of an incident in which twenty-six dollars in an 
envelope went missing from a teacher’s desk and the students in 
her class were suspected of taking it.130  The students were led 
to bathrooms and males were searched by the SRO, who was also 
 
126.  959 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (D. Kan. 1997). 
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. 
129.  323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003). 
130.  Id. at 952. 
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male, and females were searched by a female teacher.131  The 
students were required to pull down their pants and underwear, 
and expose their private parts.132  The court concluded that the 
search was unconstitutional because the SRO and school 
officials lacked individualized suspicion.133  However, prior case 
law did not clearly establish this and the constitutional violation 
was not so egregious to overcome statutory immunity in light of 
the lack of clear precedent.134 
In Burlison v. Springfield Public Schools, the Eighth Circuit 
dismissed a Section 1983 claim against an SRO and others that 
arose out of a suspicionless search of students’ belongings with 
a drug sniffing dog.135  The students were forced to leave their 
classroom while the dog sniffed their belongings, and the 
plaintiff student claimed that his bag had been opened and 
searched, though he had no further evidence that this had 
occurred.136  In dismissing the claim, the court cited the officer’s 
adherence to drug sniffing dog procedures, the existing drug 
problem at the school where the search was conducted, and the 
minimized rights of students in school against searches.137  
Further, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that 
individualized suspicion was needed under these 
circumstances.138 
The wide array of behaviors that are prohibited by school 
codes of conduct also preclude successful Section 1983 claims 
against SROs for unreasonable searches.  For example, in G.M. 
ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc, a search of a student for a cell phone by 
an SRO was deemed justified at its inception because use of a 
cell phone by students during teaching time was a violation of 
school rules.139  The court applied the reasonableness standard 
to the search and found that the student’s alleged violation of 
 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. (this case was decided before Redding, which likely renders mass 
strip searches such as this one are unconstitutional).  
133.  Id. at 956. 
134.  Id. 
135.  708 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2013). 
136.  Id. at 1036-37. 
137.  Id. at 1039-40. 
138.  Id. at 1040. 
139.  982 F. Supp. 2d at 1235; see also infra Part III.C (discussing Johnson 
ex rel. Smith v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D. Mich. 2006)). 
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1
WOLF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:20 PM 
2018 CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS AGAINST SROs 243 
the cell phone policy was enough to justify the search.140 
Thus, the high bar set by qualified immunity is seemingly 
insurmountable for students seeking compensation under 
Section 1983 against SROs for unreasonable searches.  First, 
cases that grapple with the question of whether SROs are law 
enforcement officers, as opposed to school officials, when 
searching students are relatively rare.  Second, the existing case 
law that more frequently applies the reasonable suspicion 
standard to SRO searches of students renders the law unclear 
enough to support qualified immunity defenses for the SROs in 
almost all cases, as all they need is reasonable suspicion to 
justify the search.141  Additionally, because SROs are often 
viewed as school officials responding to violations of school rules, 
the wide array of behavior that is forbidden by school codes of 
conduct provides a remarkably wide array of justifications for 
searches, even though criminal behavior may not be suspected. 
That mass suspicionless searches are also permitted in schools 
further protects SROs against such claims. 
 
 B. Section 1983 Claims Against SROs Arising Out of Alleged 
Violations of Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights 
Against Unreasonable Seizures 
 
Students have found greater success in Section 1983 claims 
against SROs arising out of their Fourth Amendment rights 
against unreasonable seizure.  However, claims that survive 
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment still only 
arise in very limited circumstances. 
In Gray v. Bostic, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that a SRO violated a fourth-grade student’s Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable seizure when he 
handcuffed her after she threatened her gym teacher.142  
 
140.  The court also found that the search was justified because it was 
incident to arrest. G.M. ex rel. B.M., 982 F. Supp. 2d at 1248. 
141. Developments in the Law – Policing: Chapter Two: Policing Students, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1753 (2015) (“Cases where courts find that a search of 
a student required probable cause are rare and usually involve either an 
outside police search only tangentially related to the school setting, or an SRO 
who has a purely law enforcement role.”). 
142.  458 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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Importantly, the threatened coach testified that he did not 
actually fear that the young student would harm him.143  The 
SRO admitted that he handcuffed her to teach her the potential 
severe consequences of her actions.144  The court found that a 
Fourth Amendment violation occurred, based on T.L.O.’s two-
step analysis, which focuses on whether the search or seizure 
was justified at its inception and “reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified interference in the first 
place.”145  Since the student committed a misdemeanor when she 
threatened her teacher, the seizure was justified at its 
inception.146  Here, the court found that the SRO was acting 
within his duties as an SRO because detaining students was 
something SROs sometimes did when students committed 
crimes in school (and threatening bodily harm is a 
misdemeanor).147  However, the handcuffing of the student was 
not reasonably related in scope because she did not pose a threat, 
a fact that was bolstered by the SRO’s admission that the 
handcuffing was done only to teach the student a lesson.148  The 
court further concluded that the SRO was not entitled to 
qualified immunity because the handcuffing was contrary to 
clearly established law, stating: “Every reasonable officer would 
have known that handcuffing a compliant nine-year-old child for 
purely punitive purposes is unreasonable.”149  Notably, there 
was not any precedential case law that was factually similar to 
this case, but the court nevertheless found that the handcuffing 
was clearly outside the bounds of legality.150 
In Jordan v. Blackwell, a Section 1983 claim was brought 
against an SRO who physically restrained a thirteen-year-old 
female student in order to extricate her from a fight in which she 
was the aggressor and transport her to the principal’s office.151  
The SRO took hold of the student’s arms, allegedly in a 
 
143.  Id. at 1302. 
144.  Id. at 1301. 
145.  Id. at 1304.  
146.  Id. 
147.  Id. at 1295.  
148.  Gray, 458 F.3d at 1306. 
149.  Id. at 1307. 
150.  Id. 
151.  No. 5:06-cv-214, 2008 WL 4449576, at *1 (M.D. Ga. 2008). 
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chokehold, and broke her shoulder.152  The United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia found that an 
issue of fact remained regarding whether the SRO’s use of force 
violated the student’s Fourth Amendment rights.153  The SRO 
and student offered different descriptions of the force that was 
used, leading the court to leave the key factual determination in 
the hands of the factfinder at trial.154  The court similarly found 
that the question of qualified immunity was also dependent on 
the resolution of this factual dispute, as the circumstances of the 
force that was used would determine whether the SRO 
reasonably believed his use of force complied with existing legal 
standards.155 
Likewise, in Williams v. Morgan, the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
a district court’s denial of an SRO’s motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that issues of fact remained regarding 
whether the student posed a threat and whether the SRO used 
excessive force.156  In Williams, an SRO broke a thirteen-year-
old student’s arm when he used an arm hold to restrain her.157  
The student had been in a verbal argument with another 
student earlier in the day and had torn posters off the walls of 
the school after receiving her punishment for the argument (a 
five-day suspension).158  Later that day, the SRO confronted the 
student about the posters in a stairwell.159  He believed she acted 
defiantly “by putting one foot behind her and putting her hands 
on her hips,” and proceeded to push her against the wall and 
bend her arm behind her back with enough force to break her 
arm.160  A video camera recorded a significant part of this 
altercation, including a moment when the SRO applied enough 
force while holding her arm behind her back to lift the student 
off the ground.161  The court also noted that the student’s crimes 
(“criminal damaging and disorderly conduct” according to the 
 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. at *3. 
154.  Id. at *5. 
155.  Id. at *6.  
156.  652 Fed. App’x. 365 (6th Cir. 2016). 
157.  Id. at 367. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. at 367. 
31
WOLF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:20 PM 
246 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38.2 
SRO) were not serious enough to warrant an arrest or 
prosecution.162  Based on this evidence, the court confirmed that 
a jury was the proper arbiter of whether the student’s rights 
were violated.163 
While these cases reveal certain circumstances in which 
Section 1983 claims based on unreasonable seizure can be 
successful, other decisions demonstrate that the scope of such 
circumstances is quite limited.  For example, in Hoskins v. 
Cumberland County Board of Education, parents of an eight-
year-old second grader alleged that an SRO had violated their 
son’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure 
when the SRO handcuffed the student for forty-five minutes.164  
The handcuffing followed a series of events in which the student 
swung his fist in the vicinity of a teacher and threatened to hit 
the principal and SRO.165  In order to determine if the student’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the court considered 
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] 
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and 
whether he [wa]s actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 
arrest by flight.”166  The court determined that the seizure was 
unreasonable because of the child’s young age, the relatively 
minor nature of his crime, and the fact that he did not pose a 
serious threat to anyone.167  The court further reasoned that the 
special nature of the school environment that often lessens 
students’ civil rights did not apply in this case because the 
handcuffing was clearly related to a law enforcement function 
(the SRO planned to charge the student with a misdemeanor and 
take him to juvenile detention).168  However, the court ultimately 
determined that the student’s parents failed to meet their 
burden of proving that the SRO was not entitled to qualified 
immunity because they failed to demonstrate that the SRO 
clearly violated the law.169  The court pointed to the lack of 
 
162.  Williams, 652 Fed App’x at 374.  
163.  Id. 
164.  No. 2:13-cv-15, 2014 WL 7238621, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). 
165.  Id. at *3. 
166.  Id. at *6 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 
167.  Id. at *7. 
168.  Id. at *11. 
169.  Id. at *13. 
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evidence regarding what occurred during the forty-five minute 
handcuffing and whether the principal and SRO could have 
reasonably feared for their safety.170  Notably, the court pointed 
to Bostic (discussed above) as a case in which the plaintiffs 
demonstrated that an SRO was not entitled to qualified 
immunity when he handcuffed a fourth grader because there 
was evidence that the child was sitting quietly while handcuffed 
and school staff testified that they were not afraid of the student 
at the time.171  This case highlights yet another challenge in 
bringing successful Section 1983 claims against SROs – 
gathering reliable evidence is often difficult because it often 
rests on the testimony of minors. 
In Hayenga v. Nampa School District No. 131, an SRO was 
alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment rights of an 
eleven-year-old developmentally disabled student.172  The SRO 
used force to subdue the student when he attempted to leave his 
classroom after tapping on his desk and being verbally 
aggressive.173  The SRO took the student to the ground, 
“hobbled” the student’s legs, and handcuffed the student (with 
the help of other officers).174  The student was then transported 
to the hospital on a mental hold, but continued to struggle 
against his confinement and complained of pain.175  The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s granting of the SRO’s motion 
for summary judgment, even though it concluded that the SRO 
used excessive force in subduing the student (based on the 
student’s version of the facts).176  Because there was not prior 
case law that “squarely” fit the facts of this case, and the SRO’s 
actions “fell into the ‘hazy border between excessive and 
acceptable force,’” the SRO was entitled to qualified immunity 
according to the court.177 
 
170.  Hoskins, No. 2:13-cv-15, 2014 WL 7238621, at *6, 13. 
171.  Id. at *12. 
172.  123 Fed. App’x. 783 (9th Cir. 2005). 
173.  Id. at 786. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. 
177.  Id. at 786.  In a more recent, reported decision, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed a trial court’s verdict in favor an 11-year-old elementary school 
student with ADHD who asserted similar Section 1983 claims against police 
officers (not SROs) who handcuffed him at school.  See C.B. v. City of Sonora, 
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Likewise, in J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo County, the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed a summary judgment in favor of a SRO who 
arrested and handcuffed an eleven-year-old female student after 
the SRO observed her kicking a teacher in her special needs 
classroom.178  While the student’s act of kicking her teacher 
clearly constituted a crime and justified her arrest under the 
law, whether it was appropriate to handcuff the student is a 
closer question, given her age and special needs.  Yet, the court 
concluded that her young age did not undermine the SRO’s 
concern for safety and need to maintain control; therefore, the 
use of handcuffs was justified.179 
 
 C. The Extraordinary Result: Benign Misbehavior Leading 
to Permissible Searches and Seizures 
 
In Johnson v. City of Lincoln Park, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted an 
SRO’s motion for summary judgment in a case in which the SRO 
twice tased a fourteen-year-old student who had previously been 
diagnosed as emotionally impaired.180  The events leading up to 
the tasing demonstrate how the involvement of an SRO in 
routine school discipline matters can escalate quickly and result 
in potentially abusive behavior against students, yet leave those 
students without legal recourse.181  Johnson arose from an 
occurrence in which a student brought a Gameboy into school, in 
clear violation of school rules. When he was brought to the 
principal’s office, he repeatedly and loudly refused to surrender 
 
769 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2014).  On the day in question, the student had 
forgotten to take his medication that helped regulate his symptoms, and was 
sitting quietly and unresponsively on the playground at recess.  Id.  When a 
school official directed the student to go inside, the student did not move.  Id.  
Eventually, the official called the police and the officer that arrived handcuffed 
the student, placed him in a police car, and transported him to his uncle’s 
business.  Id. Notably, the student remained quiet during each encounter, and 
complied with all of the officer’s requests.  Id.  The court held that existing law 
clearly established that the seizure of the student was unreasonable under the 
circumstances. Id.  
178.  806 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2015). 
179.  Id. at 1258. 
180.  Johnson ex rel. Smith v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467 
(E.D. Mich. 2006). 
181.  Id. at 469. 
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the Gameboy.182  The SRO was called in to assist in the situation, 
but the student continued to refuse.  The SRO then stood the 
student up and began to pat the student down in search of the 
Gameboy.183  This physical contact agitated the student who 
took a swing at the SRO and a struggle ensued; the student bit 
the officer three times during the struggle.184  The SRO 
eventually handcuffed the student, but the student continued to 
thrash in an attempt to prevent the SRO from searching him.185  
After a warning, the officer tased the student once through his 
clothing and then on his bare skin, leading the student to stop 
struggling.186 
The student was ultimately charged with assaulting an 
officer and with resisting arrest, which seems understandable 
given his actions towards the SRO.187  However, that these 
events arose out of the student’s possession of a Gameboy and 
the SRO’s decision to physically search an emotionally impaired 
and noticeably agitated student raises serious concerns.  
Additionally, the SRO’s decision to tase the student twice after 
handcuffing him also calls the SRO’s actions into question.  Yet, 
the decision to grant the SRO’s motion for summary judgment 
on the student’s Section 1983 claims based on unreasonable 
search and seizure was straightforward to the court.188  First, 
the search for the Gameboy was justified because the student 
was reasonably suspected of breaking a school rule.189  Second, 
the student’s argument that he should not be arrested was easily 
defeated by the fact that he swung at and bit the SRO.190  Third, 
the court found that the SRO did not use excessive force when 
he tased the handcuffed student because the student continued 
to struggle despite being handcuffed.191  The court further noted 
that the student’s injuries – a rug burn and small bruise from 
 
182.  Id. at 470.  
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. 
185.  Johnson, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 470. 
186.  Id. at 470-71.  
187.  Id. at 471.  
188.  Id. at 478-80.  
189.  Id. at 477.  
190.  Id. at 477-78.  
191.  Johnson, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 478-81. 
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the taser – suggested that the use of force was not excessive.192  
So, a case that started with the possession of a Gameboy by an 
emotionally-impaired student ultimately led to his being tased 
twice, despite being handcuffed.  Yet, the student’s 1983 claim 
was far from being viable. 
The dismissal of a student’s Section 1983 claims for 
unreasonable seizure in G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc raised 
similar concerns.193  There, a student was arrested by an SRO 
and charged with a misdemeanor for “willfully interfering with 
the educational process . . . by committing, threatening to 
commit, or inciting others to commit any act that would disrupt, 
impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission, processes, 
procedure or functions of a public . . . school.”194  The arrest 
resulted from the student’s possession and use of a cell phone in 
school – she had used it to text in class and refused to turn it 
over after she was removed from class.195  After warnings from 
the SRO, the student continued to refuse to give him her cell 
phone and she was handcuffed, searched, and then arrested.196  
The student remained calm during the entire series of events.197  
While the court recognized that the above statutory language did 
not clearly apply to the student’s behavior because it did not 
seem like she was intending to disrupt the educational process 
at her school, it concluded that the SRO was entitled to qualified 
immunity because the language of the statute arguably applied 
to her behavior and no prior case law existed to clearly dispute 
his interpretation.198  Much like Johnson, the involvement of an 
SRO in a routine and benign disciplinary incident quickly 
escalated in to an arrested and handcuffed student. 
A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes offers another instance of 
childish, relatively benign behavior quickly turning into 
criminal charges against the student.199  However, in that case, 
the student did little to contribute to the escalation.  The 
 
192.  Id. at 478-80.  
193.  982 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D.N.M. 2013). 
194.  Id. at 1240-43.  
195.  Id. at 1240.  
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. 
198.  Id. 
199.  830 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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student’s arrest stemmed from his classroom behavior, which 
consisted of him burping and laughing along with his 
classmates.200  His teacher removed him from the class to the 
hallway, but the student continued to burp into the classroom.201  
At this point, the school’s SRO intervened and walked the 
student to his office.202  The student complied, waited for the 
SRO to retrieve his computer from his car, and then was charged 
with “interfering with the educational process.”203  The officer 
then walked the student to his patrol car, searched the student, 
handcuffed him, and then drove him to a detention center.204  
The student’s mother brought a civil rights claim against the 
SRO, based on unlawful arrest and excessive force claims.  
However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment order 
in the SRO’s favor based on qualified immunity.205  The court 
concluded that there was not any clear case law that placed the 
student’s disruptive burping outside the scope of the law against 
interfering with the educational process.  Rather, the court 
determined the statute in question was worded broadly and 
could have been reasonably interpreted to apply to the student 
behavior, as his burping and laughing “stopped the flow of 
student educational activities, thereby injecting disorder into 
the learning environment . . .”206  Even though this 
interpretation of the law could feasibly apply to any small act of 
student disruption, such as speaking out of turn or passing notes 
in class, the court used it to conclude that qualified immunity 
applied in this case.207 
In almost every other context, the arrest and handcuffing of 
a person who calmly refused to turn over their cell phone would 
obviously raise significant civil rights concerns.  Likewise, 
applying criminal sanctions for burping and laughing seems 
unimaginable outside of the school context.  However, the 
 
200.  Id. at 1129-30.  
201.  Id.   
202.  Id. at 1130.  
203.  Id. 
204.  Id.   
205.  A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2016). 
206.  Id. at 1142. 
207.  Id. at 1169. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (highlighting case law that 
suggests the officer should have reasonably known the statute did not apply to 
the student’s behavior).   
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primacy that legislatures and courts place on maintaining order 
in schools allows interactions such as these between SROs and 
students to occur.  Additionally, because SROs serve in dual law 
enforcement/school official roles, they are able to rely on the 
broad scope of school rules to justify searching and seizing 
students.  Likewise, schools’ reliance on SROs to address 
challenging incidents of student misbehavior, including minor 
issues such as Gameboy possession, cell phone use, and burping, 
creates frequent interactions between SROs that can easily 
escalate, such that arrests and handcuffs arise out of relatively 
benign behavior.  As trained police officers, SROs often rely on 
justice system responses to student misbehavior, instead of more 
therapeutic responses that could resolve misbehavior without 
such extreme outcomes.  It appears that Section 1983 claims are 
of limited utility for students seeking to push back against 
criminalized responses to their misbehavior. 
 
 D. Important Limitations 
 
There are certain limitations inherent in analyzing the 
current state of legal claims based on reported court decisions 
(and unreported decisions available on legal databases).  First, 
they do not include claims that were made, but were resolved 
without producing any court opinions, most commonly through 
settlement or dismissal.  It is safe to assume that most of settled 
cases were based on clear violations of students’ civil rights.  For 
example, a handful of videos have surfaced that document SROs 
body slamming, hitting, and dragging students in clear displays 
of excessive force that would lead to successful claims.208 
Second, these decisions do not include potential Section 
1983 claims against SROs that were never made.  As Barry Feld 
noted, students and their parents may opt against pursuing such 
claims for a variety of reasons, including being unaware of the 
potential for such claims, the power dynamics between schools, 
SROs, and students, and fear of reprisal if the student must 
 
208.  See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, School Officer Fired After Video Showed 
Him Body-Slamming a 12-Year-Old Girl, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/04/11/school-
officer-fired-after-video-showed-him-body-slamming-a-12-year-old-girl/; Ford, 
Botelho & Conlon, supra note 45.  
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remain enrolled in the school after filing suit.209 
 
V. Strengthening Students’ Section 1983 Claims 
 
Since the Roberts Court began to re-fortify the qualified 
immunity defense, legal scholars have worried that it has 
become too formidable and undermines the purpose of Section 
1983.210  Some contend that it provides too much protection for 
government officials.211  Others worry that its current 
configuration, which relieves the courts of having to determine 
if a plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated as long as it 
determines that the right in question was not clearly 
established, may slow the development of constitutional 
standards.212 
More recently, William Baud argued that the legal 
justifications for this defense that the Court has offered are all 
faulty.213  For example, the Court has commonly suggested that 
qualified immunity is supported by the traditional “good faith” 
defense that protected government actors from tort liability if 
they were acting in good faith that they were following 
established law (such as making an arrest when they mistakenly 
believed they had probable cause to make the arrest).214  Baud 
notes that the Court initially rejected this defense when 
considering a Section 1983 claim.215  He then goes on to detail 
how, despite this initial rejection, this defense was retroactively 
used (and then expanded) to support the qualified immunity 
defense against Section 1983 claims.216  Baud proceeds to 
 
209.  Feld, supra note 8. 
210.  See, e.g., William Baud, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. 
L. REV. 45 (2018); Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional 
Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 141; Karen Blum et. al., Qualified 
Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 
633 (2013). 
211.  Baud, supra note 210, at 46-47 (citing Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-
Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 
1522-24 (2016)).  
212.  Id. at 47 (citing Aaron Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New 
Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2015)). 
213.  Id. 
214.  Id. at 53. 
215.  Id. at 57-58. 
216.  Id. at 59-61. 
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critique other justifications for qualified immunity found in 
Supreme Court opinions, concluding: 
 
The Court’s crusade to enforce the doctrine of 
qualified immunity does not serve congressional 
intent or the rule of law. . . . If qualified immunity 
leads to bad consequences, it can be fixed . . . . [I]t 
can be overruled.  And even if it the Court does not 
overrule it, it can stop expanding the legal 
error.217 
 
The current prominence of citizens’ violent encounters with the 
police suggest that the qualified immunity defense may be ripe 
for serious reconsideration.218  The cases detailed here add 
further support to this notion, as several illustrate how the 
doctrine has shielded SROs from liability for seemingly 
egregious behavior. 
Beyond the potential reform of qualified immunity, which 
may be unrealistic given the Court’s consistent support of it, 
reforms in the way SROs are permitted to operate could also 
strengthen students’ ability to bring successful Section 1983 
claims against SROs and fortify their rights in schools. 
The unique role of SROs and the diminished rights of 
students in schools limit students’ abilities to bring successful 
civil rights claims against SROs to only the most egregious of 
cases.  Specifically, the minimal protections students have 
against being searched seems to have made Section 1983 claims 
against SROs for unreasonable searches nonviable.  Conversely, 
students’ youth (and their diminished physical prowess) do not 
seem to restrict SRO’s ability to use force when arresting 
students for even the most minor misbehavior.  The only 
situations found in court opinions that suggest that 
unreasonable force may have been used by SROs involved a 
docile fourth grader who was handcuffed to “teach her a lesson” 
and students who suffered broken bones while being restrained 
by SROs.  Qualified immunity proves to be a strong defense for 
 
217.  Id. at 88. 
218.  The current make-up of the Court is unlikely to pull back its breadth, 
however. 
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SROs, largely because existing case law is inconsistent and 
favorable to SROs’ ability to search students based on minimal 
information and use force against students even if they 
seemingly do not pose a real threat. 
Therefore, the most effective way to strengthen students’ 
ability to bring successful Section 1983 claims against the 
oppressive actions of SROs is through state or federal legislation 
governing the actions of SROs.  Legislation that provides clear 
guidelines for SROs’ interactions with the students they serve is 
the most evident way to protect students against invasive and 
aggressive actions by SROs.  The clarity of these guidelines will 
also give meaningful power to Section 1983 claims by students 
because they will undermine SROs’ qualified immunity 
defenses.  Many states have already passed legislation relating 
to SROs, so legislation on a state level is a possibility.219  
Likewise, because federal funding provides millions of dollars to 
support many SRO programs throughout the country, the 
federal government can link this funding to limits on SROs’ roles 
in schools.220  Notably, the Department of Education already has 
provided recommendations for the use of SROs in schools,221 but 
binding guidelines that are attached to funding for SROs provide 
much clearer standards for SRO behavior. 
Three provisions should be the centerpieces of such 
legislation: (1) clear delineation of SROs as law enforcement 
officials in all interactions with students; (2) limits on when 
SROs may use physical force against students, including when 
they may handcuff students; and (3) requirements for SRO 
training focused on their interactions with students that caters 
 
219.  THE COUNCIL FOR STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., Officers in Schools: A 
Snapshot of Legislative Action (2014), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/NCSL-School-Police-Brief.pdf. 
220.  See Nance, supra note 34, at 947 (detailing the significant costs of 
SROs and the hundreds of millions of dollars spent by the federal government). 
221.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR 
IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE AND DISCIPLINE (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/ 
policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/guiding-principles.pdf (stating, among other 
recommendations, “To ensure the proper functioning of any school-based law 
enforcement program and to avoid negative unintended consequences, schools 
should provide clear definitions of the officers’ roles and responsibilities on 
campus, written documentation of those roles, proper training, and continuous 
monitoring of the program’s activities through regular data collection and 
evaluation.”).   
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to the social, emotional, and intellectual realities of the student 
populations that SROs serve. 
Delineating SROs as law enforcement officials in all 
interactions with students would clarify searches and 
interrogations of student when SROs are involved.222  In the 
realm of searches, SROs’ clear status as law enforcement 
officials would render probable cause (of criminal conduct) the 
standard.  The reasonable suspicion standard that applies to 
school officials would not apply in certain situations, as it does 
now.  Additionally, suspected violations of school codes of 
conduct would also be insufficient justification for searches that 
involve SROs.  Likewise, Miranda warnings would always be 
required when SROs are involved in questioning students 
(assuming that the students are deemed “in custody” at the time 
of questioning).  Importantly, legislation considering this rule 
should also include guards against collusion by school officials 
and SROs in searches and interrogations so that SROs cannot 
defer these tasks to school officials, who are beholden to different 
rules. 
Along with this delineation, SROs should also be removed 
from schools’ disciplinary responses to minor misbehavior.223  
While SROs may have the training and ability to stop a fight 
that is in progress and deal with threats to safety in the school, 
such as weapons on campus, they do not need to be involved in 
common student misbehavior.  Even the disciplinary responses 
to schoolyard fights can be handled by school administrators 
instead of by SROs.224 
 
 
222.  Price, supra note 10, at 567-569 (arguing that a bright-line rule that 
SROs always be considered police officers in their interactions with students 
would provide clarity and protect students’ rights); see also CATHERINE Y. KIM 
& I. INDIA GERANIMO, ACLU, POLICING IN SCHOOLS: DEVELOPING A GOVERNANCE 
DOCUMENT FOR SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS IN K-12 SCHOOLS 8-13 (2009). 
223.  This solution was also suggested by the ACLU in a white paper on 
developing governance documents on SROs roles in schools.  See KIM & 
GERANIMO, supra note 222.  
224.   See, e.g., Aaron M. Thompson & Michelle E. Alvarez, Considerations 
for Integrating School Resource Officers into School Mental Health Models, 35 
CHILD. & SCHS. 131, 134 (2013) (“Developing a stepwise discipline system and 
criteria for what constitutes a school discipline issue, an arrest, and what 
events should always be subjected to review may alleviate confusion and 
protect student rights.”). 
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Placing restrictions of the use of force by SROs would 
provide clarity to interactions between SROs and students who 
are under arrest or who SROs otherwise desire to physically 
control.  A legal standard that restricts the use of force, including 
restraints, to only situations in which the student poses a danger 
or is an identifiable flight risk would curtail the use of handcuffs 
in many situations. 
Some precedent for such policy exists.  Many states have 
begun to limit the use of handcuffs on juveniles in other 
situations. For example, in several states, courts and legislators 
have considered limitations of when juveniles can be handcuffed 
and shackled when they face delinquency charges.  Delaware 
recently passed a law forbidding the shackling of juveniles facing 
delinquency charges in the state’s family court, unless the court 
makes a finding that shackling is necessary.225 Other states have 
arrived at this policy through court decisions.226  A similar 
standard could be applied to SROs in their interactions with 
students – handcuffs and other restraints should only be used 
when the officer determines the student is a threat or a flight 
risk, even when the student is under arrest. 
Finally, legislation that requires thorough training of SROs 
that would provide specific guidance to SROs in their 
interactions with students could help protect students’ rights.227  
Catering training to the social, emotional, and intellectual 
 
225.  Juvenile Justice Reform Bills Signed into Law, DEL. HOUSE 
DEMOCRATS (2016), http://www.dehousedems.com/press/juvenile-justice-
reform-bills-signed-law; see also Anne Teigen, States that Limit or Prohibit 
Juvenile Shackling and Solitary Confinement, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/states-that-limit-or-prohibit-juvenile-shackling-and-solitary-
confinement635572628.aspx. 
226.  Teigen, supra note 225. 
227.  See, e.g., George W. Timberlake, Cops in Schools Need Special 
Training About Children and Trauma, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Nov. 5, 
2015), http://jjie.org/2015/11/05/cops-in-schools-need-special-training-about-
children-and-trauma/; BARBARA RAYMOND, CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS. 
OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE RESPONSE 
GUIDES SERIES NO. 10, ASSIGNING POLICE OFFICERS TO SCHOOLS 23-24 (2010), 
http://www.popcenter.org/Responses/pdfs/school_police.pdf; Matthew T. 
Theriot & Matthew J. Cuellar, School Resource Officers and Students’ Rights, 
19 CONTEMP. J. REV. 363, 374 (2016); Lisa H. Thurau & Jonathon Wald, 
Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline in Public 
Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 1019-1020 (2009/2010).   
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realities of the student populations that SROs serve could result 
in fewer searches, less frequent handcuffing, and reduced 
physical contact between SROs and students.  Additionally, such 
training could provide clearer standards for SROs’ actions in 
these situations, and these standards could be used to buttress 
and Section 1983 claims that arise after the training is initiated.  
This training would also equip SROs with better knowledge and 
resources for the students they serve.228 Notably, some states 
already include training requirements in their SRO legislation, 
so such a policy is not outside the realm of possibility. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Students’ Section 1983 claims against SROs provide 
another window into the criminalization of America’s school 
children.  The cases detailed above, most of which result in 
unsuccessful claims against SROs, illustrate the hallway-level 
effects of both the criminalization trend in American education 
and the diminished rights of students.  They demonstrate how 
the involvement of police in routine school discipline matters can 
quickly escalate these situations to include aggressive, physical 
confrontations and arrests.  They also illustrate the extreme 
limits on students’ rights to control their persons and 
possessions in the name of maintaining order in their schools.  
While Section 1983 claims theoretically offer an avenue for 
students to push back when criminalization and rights 
suppression go too far, this remedy proves to be insufficient 
because the laws are so strongly tilted in favor of student control.  
Applicable laws and school rules commonly proscribe student 
behavior that is barely disruptive, permitting SROs and other 
school officials to search, restrain, arrest, and otherwise punish 
students under color of law.  Likewise, the treatment of SROs as 
school officials blurs their role in school and the permissible 
parameters of their interactions with students, which further 
frustrates seemingly viable civil rights claims against them. 
 
 
228.  See John Rosiak, How Mental Health Training Helps School 
Resource Officers, 9 COMMUNITY POLICING DISPATCH (Feb. 2016), 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/02-2016/mental_health_and_sros.asp. 
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Therefore, legislation at either the state or federal level that 
specifically guides the conduct of SROs is needed.  Such 
legislation should clarify their status as law enforcement officers 
in their interactions with students.  This would make it clear 
that they must have probable cause to search students and that 
the Miranda rules apply when they question students.  
Legislation should also place restrictions on SROs’ use of force 
against students, including limitations on shackling, which will 
better protect students against excessive use of force by SROs.  
Finally, comprehensive training that specifically speaks to the 
social, emotional, and intellectual realities of the student 
population is needed.  This will enable SROs to more frequently 
avoid justice system responses to student misbehavior.  
Collectively, these changes will both bolster students’ rights in 
their interactions with SROs and empower SROs to better serve 
the students that they have agreed to protect, guide, and 
counsel. 
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